Computing in social networks by Giurgiu, Andrei et al.
Information and Computation 234 (2014) 3–16Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Information and Computation
www.elsevier.com/locate/yinco
Computing in social networks✩,✩✩
Andrei Giurgiu a, Rachid Guerraoui a, Kévin Huguenin a,∗,1,
Anne-Marie Kermarrec b
a EPFL, School of Computer and Communication Systems, EPFL, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
b INRIA Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique, Campus de Beaulieu, 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Available online 21 November 2013
Keywords:
Distributed computing
Security
Privacy
Social networks
This paper deﬁnes the problem of Scalable Secure computing in a Social network: we call
it the S3 problem. In short, nodes, directly reﬂecting on associated users, need to compute
a symmetric function f : V n → U of their inputs in a set of constant size, in a scalable and
secure way. Scalability means that the spatial, computational and message complexity of
the distributed computation does not grow too fast with the number of nodes n. Security
encompasses (1) accuracy and (2) privacy: accuracy holds when the distance from the
output to the ideal result is negligible with respect to the maximum distance between
any two possible results; privacy is characterized by how the information disclosed by the
computation helps faulty nodes infer inputs of non-faulty nodes, which we capture in our
context by the very notion of probabilistic anonymity.
We ﬁrst prove that under mild regularity conditions the problem of computing an arbitrary
function can be reduced to that of component-wise addition of vectors of integers. More
speciﬁcally, if the function f is Lipschitz-continuous and the maximum distance between
two possible results is Ω(n), any protocol that S3-computes component-wise addition of
vectors of integers S3-computes f .
We then present AG-S3, a protocol that S3-computes a class of aggregation functions, that
is that can be expressed as a commutative monoid operation on U : f (x1, . . . , xn) = x1 ⊕
· · ·⊕xn , assuming the number of faulty participants is at most √n/ log2 n. We further prove
that AG-S3 S3-computes component-wise addition of vectors of integers thus extending
its application spectrum to regular functions. Key to our protocol is a dedicated overlay
structure that enables secret sharing and distributed veriﬁcations which leverage the social
aspect of the network: nodes care about their reputation and do not want to be tagged as
misbehaving.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The past few years have witnessed an explosion of online social networks and the number of users of such networks is
still growing by the day, e.g., Facebook boasts by now more than 400 millions users. These networks constitute huge live
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platforms that are exploited in many ways, from sharing personal information to conducting polls about political tendencies.
An illustrative example of computation in a social network is crowdsourcing which exploits human-based computation
capabilities and subjective and personal information of a group of users as a source of knowledge or ideas, e.g., Amazon
Mechanical Turk. It is clearly appealing to perform large-scale general purpose computations on such platforms and one
might be tempted to use a central authority for that, namely one provided by the company orchestrating the social network.
Yet, this poses several privacy problems, besides scalability. For instance, there is no guarantee that Facebook will not make
any commercial usage of the personal information of its users. In 2009, Facebook tried to change its privacy policy to impose
new terms of use, granting the company a perpetual ownership of personal contents—even if the users decide to delete their
account. The new policy was not adopted eventually, but highlighted the eagerness of such companies to use personal and
sensitive information.
We argue for a decentralized approach where the participants in the social network keep their own data and perform
computations in a distributed fashion without any central authority. A natural question that arises then is what distributed
computations can be performed in such a decentralized setting. Our primary contribution is to lay the ground for expressing
the question precisely. We refer to the underlying problem as the S3 problem: Scalable Secure computing in a Social network.
Whereas scalability characterizes the spatial, computational and message complexity of the computation, the secure aspect
of S3 encompasses accuracy and privacy. Accuracy refers to the robustness of the computation and aims at ensuring accurate
results in the presence of dishonest participants. This is crucial in a distributed scheme where dishonest participants might,
besides disrupting their own input, also disrupt any intermediary result for which they are responsible. The main challenge
is to limit the amount of bias caused by dishonest participants. Privacy is characterized by the amount of information on
the inputs disclosed to other nodes by the computation. Intuitively, achieving all three requirements seems impossible.
Clearly, tolerating dishonest players and ensuring privacy calls for cryptographic primitives. Yet, cryptographic schemes,
typically used for multi-party computations, involve too high a computation overhead and rely on higher mathematics and
the intractability of certain computations [2–4]. Instead, we leverage users’ concern for reputation using an information
theoretical approach and alleviate the need for cryptographic primitives. A characteristic of the social network context is
indeed that the nodes are in fact users who might not want to reveal their input, nor expose their misbehavior if any. This
reputation concern, as illustrated in Fig. 1, determines the extent to which dishonest nodes act: up to the point where their
misbehavior remains discrete enough not to be discovered. In a system where users report on the misbehaviors they detect,
dishonest node might be tempted to issue spurious reports on other users. However, in the context of social networks, two
key factors help thwarting such a threat: First, reports are intended to be read by users (not programs) who can assess the
credibility of the reports and decide whether to take them into account; Second, the knowledge of the social ties between
users can be leveraged. For instance, reports from an enemy or a joint report issued by users that are connected in the social
network could be disregarded. Such techniques proved eﬃcient in areas as diverse as on-line games [5], recommendation
systems [6], and spam ﬁltering [7].
Solving the S3 problem is challenging, despite leveraging this reputation concern: to ensure privacy, an algorithm must
ensure that the information obtained by the coalition of faulty nodes during the protocol is not enough to determine with
certainty a node’s input. This property should hold even when all the non-faulty nodes except one have the same inputs:
faulty nodes taking part in the computation must not know which non-faulty node had a different input. This requires
the existence of two conﬁgurations of inputs that differ for two non-faulty nodes having different inputs, which with high
probability lead to the same sequence of messages received by the faulty nodes. In turn, this comes down to swapping
two nodes’ inputs transparently (from the standpoint of the faulty nodes), which is challenging when the protocol needs to
be also scalable and accurate. The scalability requirement (i.e., each node communicates with a limited number of nodes)
makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a chain of messages that can be swapped transparently between any two nodes in the system. The
trade-off between privacy and accuracy can be illustrated by the following paradox: on the one hand verifying that nodes
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what the veriﬁed node received; on the other hand the more the nodes know about the messages exchanged the more the
privacy of the nodes is compromised.
Our contributions are twofold:
• Firstly, we deﬁne the Scalable Secure computing problem in a Social network, namely the S3 problem and prove that
it can be reduced, for regular functions, to that of computing component-wise addition of vectors of integers with
exactly one nonzero component, which is equal to 1. More speciﬁcally, if the function f is Lipschitz-continuous and the
maximum distance between two possible results is Ω(n), any protocol that S3-computes component-wise addition of
vectors of integers S3-computes f .
• Secondly, we present a distributed protocol, we call AG-S3 (i.e., S3 for AGgregation), that solves the problem for a
class of aggregation functions that derive from a monoid operation on U : f (x1, . . . , xn) = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn , under the
assumption that the number of faulty nodes is upper-bounded by
√
n/ log2 n. We further prove that AG-S3 S3-computes
component-wise addition of vectors of integers thus extending its application spectrum to regular functions. At the core
of our protocol lie (1) a structured overlay where nodes are clustered into groups, (2) a homomorphic secret sharing
scheme that allows the nodes to obfuscate their inputs, and (3) a veriﬁcation procedure which potentially tags the
proﬁles of suspected nodes.
Beyond these contributions, our paper can be viewed as a ﬁrst step toward characterizing what can be computed in a large
scale social network while accounting for the human and social nature of its users.
2. The S3 problem
This section deﬁnes the problem of Scalable Secure computing in a Social network: the S3 problem. The problem involves
an S3 candidate, namely the function to be computed, and a set of nodes  = {p1, . . . , pn}. We assume the number n of
nodes to be known by the nodes. The main notations used throughout the paper are summarized in Table A.1.
2.1. Candidates
Deﬁnition 1 (S3 candidate). An S3 candidate is a quadruple ( f , V ,U ,d), where V is an arbitrary set, f is a function f :
V ∗ → U such that f (v1, . . . , vn) = f (vσ(1), . . . , vσ(n)) for any permutation σ of the inputs, and (U ,d) is a metric space.
Each node in  has an input value in the set V , and an S3 candidate maps the inputs of the nodes to a value in
a metric space. The function f is assumed to be symmetric in the sense that the output depends on the multiset of
inputs but not on their assignment to nodes. For example, a binary poll over  can be modeled by the S3 candidate
((v1, v2, . . . , vn) → v1 + · · · + vn, {−1,+1},Z, (z1, z2) → |z1 − z2|). Indeed, in a binary poll, each node starts with a value
coding either the “yes” or the “no” options and the result of the poll is the proportion of participants who chose each of the
two options. The result of the poll can be computed by encoding the options with the integers +1 and −1 respectively and
by summing them (yielding an integer output r in Z). More speciﬁcally, the proportion of participants who chose the “yes”
option is (n + r)/2n and the majority is determined by the sign of r (e.g., with 8 participants, an output of 2 means that
the “yes” option has the majority and that 62.5% of the participants chose it). A natural distance on the output space (i.e.,
U = Z) — used to quantify the accuracy of the computation as we shall see — is the absolute difference (z1, z2) → |z1 − z2|.
In the case of m-ary polling, one could consider the component-wise addition on U = Zm , where V is the set of all vectors
of length m with exactly one nonzero component, which is either +1 or −1. The distance function is then just 1 (or
Manhattan distance).
The nodes considered in the S3 problem are users of a social network, able to (1) communicate with private message
passing and (2) tag the public proﬁle of each other. As such, every node directly reﬂects on the associated user. Nodes
care about their privacy and their reputation: a user wants neither the private information contained in her input, nor her
misbehavior, if any, to be disclosed. This reputation concern is crucial to make the problem tractable.
To ensure security, part of the computation consists in checking the correctness of other nodes’ behavior. The output of
a node p is a value in U , i.e., the result of the distributed computation of the S3 candidate, plus a set Fp of nodes that p
detected as faulty. This information is eventually reported on the public proﬁle of the involved nodes by means of tags of
the form “p detected nodes in Fp as faulty”. Nodes are allowed to report only on the nodes they communicate with and
the number of reports a node can issue is limited to limit the impact of spurious reports against non-faulty nodes.
Faulty nodes are considered rational: their goal is only to bias the output of the computation and infer the inputs of
the users taking part in the computation. Also, they never behave in such a way that their misbehavior is exposed with
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may collude.
In our context, a protocol D to perform the distributed computation of an S3 candidate on the set of nodes  is a
sequence of message exchanges and local computations such that any non-faulty node p eventually outputs a value op . The
content of the message and the nodes’ outputs are random variables whose values are determined by the random choices
made by the nodes during the computation. In the following, we deﬁne the desirable properties of a protocol in a social
network, namely scalability and security, itself encompassing privacy and accuracy.
2.2. Scalability
Scalability means intuitively that the computation is able to handle a large number of nodes (i.e., large values of n), that
is that the amount of resources needed by the protocol grows reasonably with the number of input values. Consequently,
the properties are expressed in the form of asymptotic bounds.
Deﬁnition 2 (g-Scalability). A protocol to perform a distributed computation is said to be g-scalable (for a function g :
N→N) if the message, spatial and computational complexities at each node are O(g(n) · polylogn) in the worst case.
The logarithmic factor comes from the fact that representing a node identiﬁer ranging from 1 to n requires log2 n bits.
Therefore, storing an identiﬁer or comparing two identiﬁers requires log2 n basic operations. A g-scalable protocol can
therefore involve O(g(n)) operations on node identiﬁers.
Note that g-scalability may not be a desirable property for any function g . In particular, exp-scalability is of little interest,
1-scalability is best, log-scalability is very desirable and
√
-scalability (achieved in this paper as we shall see in Section 3)
is acceptable.
2.3. Accuracy
The deﬁnition of the accuracy of a computation relies on the metric space structure of the output space U as the distance
measure enables to quantify the gap between the result of the computation and the actual result, that is f (v1, . . . , vn). To
render it meaningful, we normalize this distance by the maximum distance between any two possible results, namely the
diameter of f (V n) (where f (V n) denotes the image, w.r.t. f , of the set of sequences of n values in V ), for a distributed
computation over n nodes.
Deﬁnition 3 (g-Accuracy). A distributed computation is said to g-accurately compute an S3 candidate ( f ,U , V ,d) if:
1
(n)
· max
p non-faulty
d
(
op, f (v1, . . . , vn)
)=O
(
1
g(n)
)
,
where vi is the input of the i-th node and
(n) = max
(x1,...,xn)
(y1,...,yn)
d
(
f (x1, . . . , xn), f (y1, . . . , yn)
)
.
This deﬁnition highlights the importance of carefully specifying the distance measure of an S3 candidate: endowing the
output space with the coarse grain distance d(x, y) = 0 if x = y, and 1 otherwise, will restrict the class of S3 computations
to those that output the exact result of f . Meanwhile, for binary polling for instance, considering the natural distance (i.e.,
d(x, y) = |x− y|) and a function g that tends to inﬁnity when n tends to inﬁnity includes computations for which the error
on the tally is negligible when compared to the sample size n, as (n) = 2n.
2.4. Privacy
The privacy of users can be compromised by the information exchanged by the nodes during the course of the compu-
tation. We characterize the privacy leaks of a distributed computation by the manner in which the information gained by
curious nodes taking part in the distributed computation enables them to recover with certainty the input of a particular
non-faulty node. The information acquired by a coalition of curious nodes is composed of (1) their input values, (2) the
output of the computation and (3) the pieces of information contained in the messages exchanged during the computation
(speciﬁed by the protocol). Only the information from (3) is inherent to the computation. Clearly, the cases where an input
can be inferred from only the output and the inputs of the faulty nodes must be ignored when looking at the privacy leaks
2 The fault model considered in the paper is indeed more restricted than the Byzantine fault model. However, the problem addressed, i.e. S3, is not
directly comparable to that of Byzantine consensus as S3 includes scalability and privacy and relaxes the accuracy requirement. Consequently, the maximum
number of faulty nodes tolerated by solutions to S3 may be less than for the Byzantine consensus problem (i.e., (n − 1)/3).
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input of a non-faulty node if and only if its input can be inferred from the output of the computation and the inputs of the
faulty nodes alone. Such conﬁgurations of inputs are captured by the notion of non-ambiguous input conﬁguration that we
formalize below.
Consider for instance that all the non-faulty nodes have the same input value, say v0, and that this conﬁguration of
inputs for non-faulty nodes is the only one which, when combined with the inputs of faulty nodes, yields the observed
output. Then, the faulty nodes know that all non-faulty nodes had input v0, which breaks privacy. More concretely, consider
the case of binary polling in a system of ﬁve nodes, two of them being curious and colluding. If these two curious nodes
voted respectively for −1 and +1 and the outcome of the poll is +3 then they know with certainty that all the three other
nodes voted +1. In general, when all the non-faulty nodes have the same input, be it −1 or +1, the outcome of the poll
minus the sum of the votes of faulty nodes is equal to the number of non-faulty nodes and thus the vote of non-faulty
nodes can be inferred with certainty by the coalition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Non-ambiguous input conﬁguration). An element v = {vp}p∈ of V n is said to be a non-ambiguous input con-
ﬁguration for a coalition B if there exists a node p /∈ B such that for all input conﬁguration v′ that matches v for all nodes
in B , f (v) = f (v′) implies vp = v ′p .
Deﬁnition 5 (Trivial input conﬁguration). An element v of V n is said to be a trivial input conﬁguration for a coalition B if all
the nodes that are not in B have the same input.
Since S3 candidates are symmetric by deﬁnition, all the non-faulty nodes have the same input in a non-ambiguous
input conﬁguration, otherwise it would not possible to map two different inputs to the corresponding non-faulty nodes:
a non-ambiguous is necessarily trivial. However, a trivial input may be ambiguous. Consider for illustration the case of
addition with the input set V = {1,2,3}. The conﬁguration where all the non-faulty nodes have 2 as input is trivial but
ambiguous for the faulty nodes as it yields the same output as the conﬁguration where half of the non-faulty nodes have 1
as input and the other half has 3.
We say in our context that a distributed computation is private if the probability of recovering the input of at least
one non-faulty node decreases as 1/nα for some positive α (referred to as with high probability). We capture this notion
more formally through the notion of probabilistic anonymity, itself based on the very notion of message trace. We distinguish
between weak and strong probabilistic anonymity depending on whether all trivial input conﬁgurations are ignored or
only non-ambiguous ones. In the context of the S3 problem where the functions to be computed are symmetric, strong
probabilistic anonymity implies weak probabilistic anonymity. Note that for binary polling, i.e., addition of input values in
{−1,+1}, the trivial input conﬁgurations are all non-ambiguous: the trivial input conﬁgurations (all −1 or all +1) are the
only input conﬁgurations that yield an output of −n and +n respectively (note that to be able to infer the input values of
non-faulty nodes, the coalition needs to know the total number n of nodes). Weak and strong probabilistic anonymity are
therefore equivalent in this case.
Deﬁnition 6 (Message trace). A message trace (or trace for short) of a distributed computation is a set of messages sent and
received in a possible execution of the computation. A partial trace is the set of the messages sent or received by a subset
of the nodes. A partial trace is said to be compatible with an input conﬁguration v if it can be obtained from v with nonzero
probability. We say that two traces are equivalent with respect to a coalition B of faulty nodes if each node in B receives
the exact same messages in both traces, i.e., the two partial traces restricted to the nodes of B are equal.
We are now ready to introduce the concepts of weak and strong probabilistic anonymity, which encapsulate the degree
of privacy we require in the S3 problem.
Deﬁnition 7 (Weak probabilistic anonymity). A distributed computation is said to be weakly probabilistically anonymous if for
any coalition B of faulty nodes, for any non-faulty node p, and for any trace T compatible with a non-trivial (w.r.t. B) input
conﬁguration v, there exists with high probability a trace T ′ compatible with an input conﬁguration v ′ (w.r.t. B) such that
(1) T and T ′ are equivalent w.r.t. B and (2) v and v′ differ on the input value of node p.
Deﬁnition 8 (Strong probabilistic anonymity). A distributed computation is said to be strongly probabilistically anonymous if
for any coalition B of faulty nodes, for any non-faulty node p, and for any trace T compatible with an ambiguous (w.r.t. B)
input conﬁguration v, there exists with high probability a trace T ′ compatible with an input conﬁguration v′ (w.r.t. B) such
that (1) T and T ′ are equivalent w.r.t. B and (2) v and v′ differ on the input value of node p.
The intuition behind these deﬁnitions is that one can change the values of the non-faulty nodes in such a way that,
with high probability, the messages received by the coalition remain unchanged. Consequently, the coalition of faulty nodes
cannot distinguish between different executions of a computation in which non-faulty nodes had different inputs. Thus the
coalition hesitates between at least two input values for each node and cannot infer their inputs with certainty.
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However, such disruptions can only increase the privacy of the nodes as they would confuse the faulty nodes that try to
infer other nodes’ inputs and lead them to incorrect conclusions.
Deﬁnition 9 (S3 computation). A distributed computation is said to (g,h,weak) S3-compute (resp. (g,h, strong) S3-compute)
an S3 candidate C if it is g-scalable, it h-accurately computes C and it is weakly probabilistically anonymous (resp. strongly
probabilistically anonymous) for a set  of nodes tight to users of a social network.
2.5. Reduction to the addition problem
This sub-section shows that a protocol that (g,h,weak/strong) S3-computes component-wise addition of vectors of inte-
gers with exactly one nonzero component which is equal to 1, (g,h,weak) S3-computes any Lipschitz-continuous candidate
such that V is ﬁnite and the diameter (n) is Ω(n). The goal of this theorem is to show that, by solving the problem for
one speciﬁc S3 candidate we solve it for a much wider class of candidates as well. In particular, it motivates our choice to
focus on aggregation functions (which include component-wise addition) in this paper, as we shall see in Section 3.
The reduction of the S3 problem relies on a compact representation of the multiset of input values in a ﬁnite set V
using integer vectors such that the union of the multisets corresponds to the component-wise addition of their vector
representation. Therefore, if a protocol computes accurately the multiset of input values and if the function to be computed
is regular enough, i.e., a small deviation on the multiset of input values translates into a small deviation on its output,
then each node can locally and accurately compute the output. We now formalize the notions of Lipschitz continuity and
compact representation and prove the reduction theorem.
Deﬁnition 10 (Lipschitz continuity). A function f : A → B is said to be Lipschitz-continuous with respect to the distance
measures dA and dB , if for any two elements x and y in A the distance between f (x) and f (y) is within a constant factor
of the distance between x and y. That is, there exists a constant number k such that for all x, y in A:
dB
(
f (x), f (y)
)
 k · dA(x, y).
Consider now an S3 candidate ( f , V ,U ,d) as in Deﬁnition 1. Since f is symmetric, it can be thought of as a function
that maps a multiset of input values in V to a value in U . A natural distance between multisets, that we denote dms, is
the number of elements that appears in only one of the two multisets. For instance, dms({{1,1,2,2,3}}, {{2,3,3,4}}) is 5: 2
because of the 1s, 1 because of the 2, 1 because of the 3, and 1 because of the 4.
Provided that V is of ﬁnite size, i.e., V = {v1, . . . , v |V |}, a way to represent a multiset is to use a vector of |V | integers
where the i-th component represents the multiplicity of vi in the multiset, i.e., the number of occurrences of vi . Basic
operations on multisets such as union and the natural distance dms can be directly computed from the compact represen-
tation: union corresponds to component-wise addition and distance corresponds to the 1 norm of the component-wise
difference. Consider for the sake of illustration the set V = {v1, v2} and the multisets S1 = {{v1, v1}} and S2 = {{v1, v2}}.
The compact representations of S1 and S2 are (2,0) and (1,1) respectively. The distance dms(S1, S2) is 2 which is equal
to ‖(2,0) − (1,1)‖1 = ‖(1,−1)‖1 = |1| + | − 1| = 2. The union of S1 and S2 is {{v1, v1, v1, v2}} which corresponds to the
compact representation (2,0) + (1,1) = (3,1). The following diagram illustrates the concept of compact representation on
this sample example.
{{v1, v1}}, {{v1, v2}} ∪ms {{v1, v1, v1, v2}}
(2,0), (1,1) .+. (3,1)
{{v1, v1}}, {{v1, v2}}
dms
2
(2,0), (1,1)
‖.−.‖1
That being said, we can now deﬁne a Lipschitz-continuous S3 candidate:
Deﬁnition 11 (Lipschitz-continuous S3 candidate). An S3 candidate ( f , V ,U ,d) is said to be Lipschitz-continuous if f is
Lipschitz-continuous with respect to the distances dms and d.
Theorem 1 (Reduction of the S3 problem). Let C = ( f , V ,U ,d) be a Lipschitz-continuous S3 candidate such that (1) V is of ﬁnite
size, (2) the diameter (n) is Ω(n) and (3) there exists an algorithm A that locally computes f from the compact representation
of the multiset of inputs in O(g(N) · polylog (n)) basic operations. If a protocol D, (g,h,weak) S3-computes (w.r.t. to the 1 norm)
component-wise addition of vectors of integers with exactly one nonzero component which is equal to 1, then there exists a protocol
that (g,h,weak) S3-computes f .
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of the S3 problem. Consider the following protocol: each node p transforms its input vp into the compact representation of
the multiset {{vp}} and runs protocol D that outputs the compact representation msp of the multiset of the nodes’ inputs.
Using a compact representation of the multiset is possible as V is ﬁnite. Each node p then locally computes op = f (msp)
using algorithm A which takes the compact representation as input.
• Scalability. Protocol D is g-scalable by assumption. Therefore, its complexity is in O(g(n) · polylog (n)). So is the
complexity of A by assumption. Building the compact representation of an input value is O(logn) as it consists in
building a constant-size vector of integers coded on log2 (n) bits. The complexity of the proposed protocol is therefore
O(g(n) · polylog (n)), which proves the g-scalability property.
• Accuracy. By assumption, the multiset of inputs is h-accurately computed at each node by protocol D. The candidate C
is Lipschitz-continuous, which ensures that the error on the ﬁnal result is within a constant factor of the error on the
multiset of inputs. The diameter me(n), with respect to the distance measure dme, for the computation of the multiset
is 2n as the multisets are of size n. Finally, we have (n) = Ω(n), with respect to distance d, for candidate C . Putting
everything together, we get:
1
(n)
· max
p non-faulty
d
(
op, f (v1, . . . , vn)
)= 1
(n)
· max
p non-faulty
d
(
f (msp), f (v1, . . . , vn)
)
 k · 1
(n)
· max
p non-faulty
dms
(
msp,
{{v1, . . . , vn}})
 2k · n
(n)
· 1
ms(n)
· max
p non-faulty
dms
(
msp,
{{v1, . . . , vn}}),
1
(n)
· max
p non-faulty
d
(
op, f (v1, . . . , vn)
)=O(1) ·O
(
1
h(n)
)
.
Therefore, the proposed protocol h-accurately computes candidate C .
• Privacy. First note that for the computation of the multiset of inputs, as for binary polling, trivial inputs are non-
ambiguous. The proposed protocol can therefore, at best, achieve weak probabilistic anonymity since the inputs of the
non-faulty nodes can be inferred from the multiset when the input conﬁguration is trivial. Since the local computation
does not bring any further information to faulty nodes, the weak probabilistic anonymity of protocol D implies the
weak probabilistic anonymity of the proposed protocol for the computation of candidate C . 
Theorem 1 is an incentive to focus on the special case of component-wise vector addition and to extend the application
spectrum of existing protocols which can compute component-wise vector addition.
3. Protocol
In this section, we focus on a class of aggregation functions and propose a protocol, namely AG-S3 (S3 for AGgregation),
which (
√
,
√
,weak) S13-computes such functions for |B| √n/ log2 n faulty nodes. We further prove that the proposed
protocol satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 1, thus extending the application spectrum of AG-S3 to regular functions.
The point (
√
,
√
,weak) in the design space is of practical interest as it constitutes a quite scalable and private solution
providing relatively fast asymptotic accuracy, i.e., the error on the output tends quite rapidly to zero when n tends to inﬁnity.
In this paper, we focus on the formal deﬁnition of the problem and on the theoretical analysis of the solution. Regarding the
practical aspects of the protocol, an experimental analysis of the Dpol protocol (which makes use of many building blocks
and basic techniques common with AG-S3, as described in the related work in Section 4), reporting on its deployment on
the PlanetLab testbed in the presence of faulty nodes, message loss, synchronization issue, etc., can be found in [9].
3.1. Assumptions
We consider S3 candidates for which the function f is an aggregation function, i.e., deriving from an associative binary
operation on U : f (v1 . . . , vn) = v1⊕· · ·⊕ vn . Because an S3 candidate must be symmetric, the ‘⊕’ operation is commutative.
This induces a commutative monoid structure on (U ,⊕) and it implies that V is a subset of U . We further assume that the
‘⊕’ operation is compatible with the distance measure d in the sense that
d
(
v1 ⊕ v2, v ′1 ⊕ v ′2
)
 d
(
v1, v
′
1
)+ d(v2, v ′2). (1)
As an example, note that the S3 candidate ((v1, v2, . . . , vn) → v1 +· · ·+ vn, {−1,+1},Z, (z1, z2) → |z1 − z2|), introduced
in the previous section, satisﬁes the compatibility condition described above. A simple example of S3 candidate which
cannot be expressed as an aggregation is the one given by the sum of products of pairs of inputs, i.e., f (x1, . . . , xn) =∑
i
∑
j =i xi · x j . This function is symmetric, and choosing U = Z turns this function into a valid S3 candidate, but it is
clearly not an aggregation function.
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We assume the size of the set of possible inputs to be constant and the size of the output space to be polynomial
in n, implying that any input or output can be represented by O(logn) bits. The computational complexity of ⊕ and d are
assumed to be linear in the size of their operand, i.e., O(logn). In addition, we assume that the diameter (n) of the output
space is Ω(n). Due to this assumption, bit operators do not fall into our deﬁnition. Finally, we assume that V is closed with
respect to inverses: if v is in the input set V then v is in V as well, where v denotes the inverse of v with respect to
the ‘⊕’ operation. We denote by δV the diameter of V : δV = maxv,v ′∈V d(v, v ′).
3.2. Design rationale
The main challenge of S3 computing is the trade-off between scalability, accuracy and privacy. We describe below this
trade-off and how we address it before describing the protocol in details.
To ensure scalability, we cluster the nodes into groups of size
√
n, and require that a node sends messages only to other
nodes in a small set of neighboring groups. We introduce two parameters of the protocol, κ and l. A node p is allowed
to send messages to any other node in its own group, and to exactly l nodes in each of κ other groups. For scalability, l
and κ need to be low, since they are directly proportional to message complexity. The same for accuracy: intuitively, the
larger l and κ , the more opportunities a node has to cheat (i.e., corrupt the unique pieces of information it receives before
forwarding them), which entails a higher impact on the output. To preserve privacy (i.e., probabilistic anonymity), we need
a mechanism which, for any node p, transforms any trace into another trace, in such a manner that all messages received
by the coalition of faulty nodes are preserved, and p has a different input in the two traces. This prevents the coalition from
determining the input value of p. It will become apparent in our proof of privacy that both κ and l need to be large in
order to obtain reasonable privacy requirements. To summarize, accuracy and scalability require the parameters κ and l to
be small, whereas privacy requires them to be large. As a trade-off, we pick them both to be Θ(logn), which ensure good
S3 properties, that is
√
-scalability,
√
-accuracy and weak anonymity.
3.3. Protocol
We describe AG-S3 which computes general aggregation in an S3 manner. The protocol is composed of two interleaved
components: one computes the aggregation function while the other checks the behavior of users. The pseudo-code of all
is given in Algorithm 1 and illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3.
Structure. AG-S3 uses a special structure inspired from [10], where the n nodes are distributed into groups of size
√
n. Such
an overlay can be obtained in a distributed fashion with strong guarantees on the randomness of nodes placement in the
groups even in the presence of faulty nodes [11]. The groups (or oﬃces) are placed on a ring, with nodes from a particular
group sending messages to either nodes from the same oﬃce (called oﬃcemates) or to selected nodes from the next oﬃces
on the ring (called proxies). More speciﬁcally, a node is connected to its
√
n − 1 oﬃcemates and to l proxies in each of the
next κ groups on the ring (see Fig. 2). If a node p′ is a proxy of p, then p is said to be a client of p′ . The partitioning
into groups and their placement on the ring are chosen uniformly at random. We further assume a perfect client-proxy
matching that ensures that a proxy has exactly κ · l clients. For example, we can index the nodes inside each group and
assign to the i-th node of a group the nodes i + 1, . . . , i + l mod √n as proxies in each of the next κ groups on the ring.
We set κ = 3/2 · logn and l = 5 · |V | · logn + 1. These choices will become clear in the proofs of the next section.
Aggregation. In the ﬁrst phase, each participant splits its input into κ · l shares in V and sends them randomly to its assigned
proxies. The randomized scheme ensures that the aggregate of the shares is the input value. The shares are generated as
follows: (κ · l − 1)/2 are chosen uniformly at random, (κ · l − 1)/2 are the inverses of the randomly chosen shares, and one
is the actual input of the node.
In the counting phase, each proxy aggregates the shares received in the previous phase to obtain an individual aggregate.
Each node then broadcasts its individual aggregate to all its oﬃcemates. Each node computes the aggregate of the individual
aggregates of its oﬃcemates and obtains a local aggregate. If all nodes are non-faulty, then all local aggregates computed in
an oﬃce are identical and equal to the sum of the shares sent to proxies in the group.
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In the forwarding phase, the local aggregates are disseminated to other nodes thanks to tokens forwarded along the
ring, as explained below. The forwarding phase is bootstrapped by a special group (that can be determined by the social
networking infrastructure at random). The nodes in this special group send a token containing the local aggregate computed
in their group to their proxies in the next group only. The tokens are further forwarded along the ring. The ﬁrst time a token
reaches a node in a particular group, this node aggregates the local aggregate to the token and forwards it to its proxies in
the next group only. When a node receives a token for the second time, the node sets its own output to the value of the
token and forwards it. The third time a node receives a token, it discards it.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code version of the AG-S3 protocol.
Input: an input value v ∈ V
Variables: individual aggregate u′′ = 0U
local aggregate u′ = 0U
procedure share(v) :
1: for i = 1 to (l · κ − 1)/2 do
2: bi = rand(V ) # insertion of a random value in V (uniformly)
3: bi+(κ ·l−1)/2 = si # insertion of the inverse
4: end for
5: bl·κ = v # insertion of the input value
6: σ = rand(Sl·κ ) # share dissemination following a random permutation
7: for igroup = 1 to κ do
8: for iproxy = 1 to l do
9: send[Share, bσ (igroup ·l+iproxy)](pigroup,iproxy )
10: end for
11: end for
upon event 〈 reception | [SHARE, b] 〉 do
12: check that sender is a legitimate client
13: check that received share is a valid value # b ∈ V
14: u′′ = u′′ ⊕ b
procedure local_counting(u′′ ) :
15: for all oﬃcemate do
16: send[LocalAggregate,u′′](oﬃcemate)
17: end for
upon event 〈 reception | [LOCALAGGREGATE, u] 〉 do
18: check that sender is a legitimate oﬃcemate
19: check that received aggregate is a possible aggregation of κ · l input values
20: # d(u,w1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wκ ·l) κ · l · δV where the w1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wκ ·l are random values in V
21: u′ = u′ ⊕ u
Veriﬁcations. The purpose of veriﬁcations is to track nodes that deviate from the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the
value attached by the nodes to their reputation. The basic mechanism is that misbehaviors are reported by the participants
who discover a faulty node and subsequently tag the latter’s proﬁle. The veriﬁcations are performed in each phase of the
protocol. In the sharing phase, each proxy veriﬁes that the shares received are valid input values. In the second phase, each
node checks whether the distance between the individual aggregates sent and some random valid individual aggregate is at
most κ · l · δV . The reason for this is that due to the compatibility of the distance function with the monoid operation, for
any v1, . . . , vk, v ′1, . . . , v ′k ∈ V , we have that
d
(
v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vk, v ′1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ v ′k
)
 d
(
v1, v
′
1
)+ · · · + d(vk, v ′k) k · δV .
The veriﬁcation in the third phase works as follows: if all the tokens received by a node in a given round (remember that
tokens circulate up to three times around the ring) are not the same, then an alarm is raised and the proﬁles of the involved
nodes are tagged. Otherwise, the node broadcasts the unique value of the tokens it received to its oﬃcemates. If it is not
the case that all values broadcast are equal, again an alarm is raised.
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We prove here that AG-S3 satisﬁes the S3 conditions for |B|√n/ log2 n.
Theorem 2 (Scalability). The AG-S3 protocol is
√
-scalable.
Proof. The nodes need to maintain a list of oﬃcemates, a list of proxies, a list of clients and a ﬁxed number of elements
of U . This amounts to O(√n · logn) space complexity as nodes’ identiﬁers can be represented using O(logn) bits. A node
performs O(√n) ‘⊕’ operations each of them having a complexity in O(logn). The message complexity is similarly O(√n)
arising from the following components: a node sends κ · l = O(log2 n) shares during the sharing phase, O(√n) copies of
its individual aggregate in the counting phase, and O(√n) in the forwarding phase. Due to the peer-to-peer nature of the
protocol, a node receives as many messages as it sends. 
Theorem3 (Accuracy). The AG-S3 protocol is
√
-accurate in the presence of at most
√
n/ log2 (n) faulty nodes tight to a social network.
Proof. A faulty node can bias the output of the computation by either sending an invalid set of shares, changing the value
of its individual aggregate, or corrupt the aggregate during the forwarding phase. However, a node never misbehaves in a
way that this is exposed with certainty (by the veriﬁcations presented in the previous section).
Sharing: Not to be detected, a node must send shares in V . Therefore, the distance between the sum of a node’s shares
and a valid input is at most κ · l · δV .
Counting: Suppose that a faulty node changes its individual aggregate from v = v1 ⊕· · ·⊕ vκ ·l to some value u. When its
oﬃcemates receive its individual aggregate u they compute the distance between this aggregate and an arbitrary aggregate
w = w1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wκ ·l . If this distance is larger than κ · l · δV then the misbehavior is reported. If the distance is within the
bound, the triangular inequality yields an upper-bound on the maximum impact: d(u, v) d(u,w) + d(w, v) 2κ · l · δV .
Forwarding: To corrupt a token without being detected, the coalition of faulty nodes must fool (i.e., make a node decide
and forward a corrupted token without raising an alarm) all the non-faulty nodes of a group. Otherwise the corruption
is detected by the veriﬁcation consisting in a node broadcasting the token received to its oﬃcemates. To fool a single
non-faulty node, all the l tokens it received from its clients (remember that nodes forward tokens only to their proxies in
the next group) must be equal. Since nodes have l proxies in the next group, f faulty nodes can fool up to f non-faulty
nodes. Assuming that a group contains f non-faulty nodes (and
√
n − f faulty nodes), then corrupting a token without
being detected requires another f faulty nodes in preceding groups. That is a total of
√
n faulty nodes which cannot happen
under the assumption |B|√n/ log2 n. To conclude, the local aggregates cannot be corrupted during the forwarding phase.
The impact of a faulty node on the output of the computation is bounded by 3κ · l · δv . We have |B|  √n/ log2 n,
κ = O(logn), l = O(logn) and (n) = Ω(n). Putting everything together, we get that the accuracy of Deﬁnition 3 is
O(√n/ log2 n · logn · logn/n) =O(1/√n), which concludes the proof. 
Theorem 4 (Weak probabilistic anonymity). The AG-S3 protocol is weakly probabilistically anonymous.
Proof. We need to show that, with high probability, there exists a mechanism that for any node p, transforms any trace
in such a way that the coalition of faulty nodes receives the same messages, but p has a different input. We ﬁrst give an
outline of the proof.
The transformation mechanism consists in changing the values transmitted between non-faulty nodes, in such a way that
any subsequent message sent by non-faulty nodes to the nodes in the coalition does not change. As a result, the coalition
receives the same information. Remember that the coalition knows (1) the inputs of all the faulty nodes, (2) the shares
received by all the faulty nodes, (3) the individual aggregates of all the faulty nodes’ oﬃcemates, and (4) possibly all the
local aggregates. We focus on weak privacy. Therefore we consider a non-trivial input conﬁguration, with respect to the
coalition. That is that at least two non-faulty nodes have different inputs. The basic idea of this mechanism is to swap the
inputs of two nodes p1 and p2, provided that there is a non-compromised group g (i.e., a group with no faulty nodes) that
contains proxies of both p1 and p2. In this case, we can modify the shares sent by p1 and p2 to proxies in g , in such a
way that the local aggregate of g is maintained. Since we assume that all nodes in g are non-faulty, the coalition does not
have access to information exchanged in g during the counting phase. The coalition only sees what the nodes in g decide
to broadcast in the forwarding phase, but that is identical to what is sent in the original trace. To modify the shares of p1
and p2, we assume that both send a share containing their own input to some proxies in g . Each of p1 and p2 has l proxies
in g , so the larger l, the larger the probability that our assumption is true. Then the aforementioned shares of p1 and p2
are swapped, resulting a consistent trace, where p1 and p2 swapped input values.
In case there is no such common non-compromised group g for p1 and p2, we may still ﬁnd a chain of nodes with
endpoints p1 and p2, such that two consecutive nodes in the chain can swap input values. The larger κ , the larger the
probability that such a chain exists. Afterwards, the nodes can swap shares along the chain, resulting in a consistent con-
ﬁguration where p1 has as input the old input value of p2. The rest of the proof concerns making our outline description
precise.
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Let T be a trace of AG-S3 generated from a non-trivial input conﬁguration v, B be a coalition of faulty nodes (|B| √
n/ log2 n) and p be a non-faulty node. Since the input is non-trivial, there exists a node p′ whose input is different from
the input of p in v. We prove that with high probability there exists a trace equivalent to T from the stand-point of the
coalition and compatible with an input conﬁguration v′ which is the same as v, except that the inputs of p and p′ have
been swapped.
We say that a group is compromised if it contains at least one faulty node. The coalition of faulty nodes knows the local
aggregates of all the groups, the individual aggregates of the proxies in the compromised groups, the shares they received
and their own inputs.
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The probability that in any sequence of κ − 1 consecutive groups there is at least one non-compromised group is at least
1− √n( |B|√
n
)κ−1
.
Proof. This probability is minimized if no two faulty nodes lie in the same group, i.e., there are |B| compromised groups.
Fix κ − 1 consecutive groups. The number of conﬁgurations in which these groups are compromised is (√n−κ+1|B|−κ+1). The total
number of conﬁgurations is
(√n
|B|
)
, so the probability that all the ﬁxed k consecutive groups are compromised is given by the
ratio of the two binomial coeﬃcients, which is upper-bounded by (|B|/√n)κ−1. We use the union bound to upper-bound
the probability that there is at least one such a sequence of κ −1 consecutive compromised groups. There are √n sequences
of κ − 1 consecutive groups, which proves the lemma. 
Since κ = 3/2 · logn and |B|√n/ log2 n, we get that the probability of having κ consecutive compromised groups is
at most 1/n.
Lemma 2. Given x ∈ V , the probability that a node sends at least one share of value x to a proxy situated in a given group, assuming
this node has proxies in that group, is at least 1− 1/n5/2 .
Proof. The l shares sent to a group by a node are randomly picked from a set of κ · l shares in which (κ · l − 1)/2 are
random, (κ · l − 1)/2 are the inverses of the random shares, and one is the actual input of the node. At least (l − 1)/2
of them are independent, and drawn uniformly at random from V . Thus, the probability that a is not one of them is at
most (1 − 1/|V |)(l−1)/2. Since (l − 1)/2 = 5/2 · |V | · logn, this probability is upper-bounded by 1/n5/2, which proves the
lemma. 
Consider two non-faulty nodes p and p′ in two consecutive groups, such that vp = v ′p . Both of them have proxies in the
κ groups following their respective groups on the ring. Since they lie in consecutive groups, there are κ −1 groups in which
both of them have proxies. We assume that one of these groups is not compromised (Lemma 1 gives a lower bound on the
probability that this situation occurs). We call this group g . We further assume that at least one share sent by p (resp. p′) is
equal to its input value vp (resp. v ′p) (Lemma 2 gives a lower bound on the probability that this situation occurs). Swapping
these two shares maintains a valid trace (in which the input of p is v ′p and the input of p′ is vp) that is equivalent to the
original trace from the stand-point of the coalition. This guarantees the probabilistic anonymity of non-faulty nodes with
different inputs and located in consecutive groups. Fig. 4 illustrates this transformation.
We now extend our result to non-faulty nodes in arbitrary groups. Let g(·) denote the index of a group in which a node
lies. Without loss of generality, we assume that g(p) = 0. Since we assume that the input v is not trivial, let p′ be a node
such that its input v ′p is different from the input of p. Let i1, . . . , iM be a sequence of group indexes such that: (1) group gim
is non-compromised for all m, (2) 0 < i1 < κ , (3) 0 < im+1 − im < κ for all m, and (4) 0 < iM − g(p′) < κ . Such a sequence
exists with high probability according to Lemma 1. For all 1 m < M , we deﬁne pm as an arbitrary non-faulty node in
group gim−1. Additionally, we set p0 = p and pM = p′ . Since all nodes have proxies in the κ groups succeeding them, we
have that for all 1m M , pm−1 and pm both have proxies in gim as depicted in Fig. 5.
14 A. Giurgiu et al. / Information and Computation 234 (2014) 3–16Fig. 5. Illustration of the proof of privacy: pairs of shares sent in the same group can be swapped ((a) → (b)) leading to an equivalent trace compatible
with a different conﬁguration of inputs.
Using Lemma 2 and using a union bound on the 1 m  M , we get that the probability that for all 1m  M , pm−1
sends a share of value vp to a proxy in gm and pm sends a share of value vp to a proxy in gm , is at least 1 − 2M/n5/2.
Since M is bounded by the number of groups, namely
√
n, this probability is lower-bounded by 1− 2/n2.
Assuming that this event occurs, we exhibit a trace compatible with a conﬁguration of inputs where the inputs of p and
p′ are swapped: for all 1m M , the vp share sent by pm−1 to gim is replaced by v ′p and the v ′p share sent by pm to gim
is replaced by vp , as illustrated in Fig. 5. This trace is equivalent to T with respect to the coalition B as no share sent to a
compromised group is changed and all local aggregates remain the same.
We complete the proof by showing that this trace is indeed compatible with the modiﬁed conﬁguration of inputs. In the
case of AG-S3, compatible means that the set of shares sent by a node is composed of (κ · l−1)/2 values of V , their inverses,
and the actual input of the node. For p and p′ , we only change the value of one share equal to their inputs. Therefore, their
set of shares remains compatible with their new inputs. For the other nodes pm , 0<m < M , two of their shares are simply
swapped.
We proved that the privacy of a given non-faulty node p is preserved with probability at least 1 − 2/n2, given that the
event of Lemma 1 occurs. Since the probability of this event is large (according to Lemma 1), using Bayes’s rule it is clear
that 1− 3/n2 is an upper bound on the probability that privacy of a particular node is preserved. Using a union bound over
the whole set of at most n non-faulty nodes, we obtain that probabilistic anonymity as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7 is preserved
with probability 1− 2/n. 
It can be seen from the previous proofs that the proposed solution trades accuracy for privacy. This is captured by
parameters κ and l: privacy requires these parameters to be O(logn), which entails a higher impact on the output which,
in turn, reduces the maximum number of faulty-node the protocol can tolerate. Note that large values of κ and l also
decrease scalability. In our case however, the overhead is proportional to κ · l, which ﬁts into the poly-logarithmic factor of
Deﬁnition 2.
3.5. Generalization
In this sub-section we prove that AG-S3 veriﬁes the conditions of Theorem 1. To do so, we prove that, using a compact
representation of multisets, the union of all singleton multisets representing the nodes’ inputs is an aggregation function
that meets the requirements of AG-S3.
Proof. Let V be the input set of the S3 candidate to compute, V ′ be the set of vectors of integers which components
are all null except one that is in {−1,+1}, and U ′ be the set of vectors of integers of size |V | whose components are in
{−n · κ · l, . . . ,n · κ · l}. We equip U ′ with the binary operator ⊕ deﬁned as:
(x1, . . . , x|V |) ⊕ (y1, . . . , y|V |) =
(
(x1 + y1)/[−n·κ ·l,n·κ ·l], . . . , (x|V | + y|V |)/[−n·κ ·l,n·κ ·l]
)
,
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values outside of the interval {−n · κ · l, . . . ,n · κ · l} are truncated. The computational complexity of ⊕ and ‖. − .‖ is linear
in the size of their operands. At the end of the computation, negative components are set to 0 and components greater
than n are truncated. Note that this does not decrease accuracy (w.r.t. ‖.− .‖) as a valid representation of a multiset has all
its components in {0, . . . ,n}.
It can now be seen that, under this formalism, the S3 candidate (V ′,U ′,⊕,‖. − .‖) corresponding to the computation
of the multiset of inputs falls into the conditions of use of AG-S3. Indeed, V is a ﬁxed-size set, closed with respect to the
inverse. The set U ′ is of size 2n · κ · l, which is upper-bounded by a polynomial of n as κ and l are O(log (n)). Also, the
diameter is 2n which is an Ω(n). Finally, the distance measure ‖. − .‖ is compatible with ⊕. 
We have now shown that AG-S3 satisﬁes the condition of application of Theorem 1, which implies that AG-S3 can be
used to compute a wider class of functions, that is Lipschitz continuous functions f on a ﬁnite size set such that the
diameter of the image space is Ω(n) and such that f can be computed locally from the compact representation of the
multiset of inputs in a
√
-scalable way.
4. Related work
Cryptographic primitives and secure multi-party computation [2–4] allow to compute aggregation functions in a secure
way. This however comes at the price of limited scalability (at least linear in the number of nodes) as these protocols
usually do not compromise on accuracy, i.e., they compute the exact result. Assuming trust relationships between users of
a social network, Vu et al. [12] proposed an improved secret sharing scheme to protect privacy. In that scheme, the actual
relationships between nodes are used to determine the trustworthy participants, and the shares are only distributed to
those. In contrast, AG-S3 exploits solely the human nature of social networks without making any assumptions on the social
relationships themselves.
The population protocol model of Angluin et al. [13] provides a theoretical framework of mobile devices with limited
memory, which relates to the scalability requirement of the S3 problem. The model however can only compute ﬁrst order
formulas in Presburger arithmetic [14] and can tolerate only a constant number of benign failures [15]. The community
protocol model [16] relaxes the scalability requirements on the memory sizes of tiny agents which enables powerful com-
putations and Byzantine fault-tolerance. Yet, the model breaks anonymity as agents are assigned unique ids. This illustrates
the trade-off between the power and security of a model on one hand and privacy on the other hand. The problem of
privacy in population protocols was also tackled in [17]. The sharing scheme of AG-S3 is inspired by the obfuscation mech-
anism proposed in that paper, namely adding unit noise (+1 or −1) to their inputs, upon a state exchange. Dpol [9], itself
also inspired by [17], can be viewed as a restricted form of AG-S3. Dpol is restricted to binary polling: it aggregates values
in {−1,+1} and it uses a rudimentary secret sharing scheme and overly structure that assume (i) a uniform distribution of
inputs, and (ii) a built-in anonymous overlay. These are the two main diﬃculties of the privacy challenge as deﬁned in the
S3 problem.
Differential privacy [18] and k-anonymity [19] are two common ways to express privacy in the context of distributed
computations on sensitive databases. Contrary to AG-S3, where faulty nodes take part in the computation, those techniques
aim at protecting the privacy of inputs from an external attacker that queries the database. Differential privacy characterizes
the amount of information disclosed by the output by bounding the impact of a single input on the output. It is typically
achieved by adding noise to the output. However, as pointed out in [20], differential privacy does not capture the cases of
rare input conﬁgurations due to the multiplicative bounds in its formulation, which is precisely the diﬃcult case we need to
address in the S3 problem, i.e., the case where everybody but one node have the same inputs. The obfuscating technique
consisting in adding noise to intermediate results cannot be used directly in the context of S3 computing as it gives more
opportunities to faulty nodes to bias the output of the computation. On the other hand, k-anonymity guarantees that any
input value maps to at least k input nodes. In the S3 problem, privacy can be seen as 2-anonymity with high probability,
expressed in a distributed setting. With AG-S3, faulty nodes cannot map any input to a restricted subset of nodes as any
two non-faulty nodes can swap their inputs transparently. It thus ensures n − B-anonymity with high probability.
5. Conclusion
Social networks now constitute huge platforms on which it is very tempting to perform large scale computations. Yet,
such computations are challenging for they require privacy, scalability and accuracy. We leverage the very fact that, in
such platforms, behind every node lies a respectable user who cares about her reputation, in order to make the problem
tractable. We deﬁne what the notion of computation means in that context and propose a protocol that computes a class
of regular functions. This is a ﬁrst step toward understanding what can be computed in a social network and many open
questions are left open: What is the maximum number of faulty nodes an S3 protocol can tolerate? What else besides
aggregation functions can be computed in an S3 manner? Indeed, while this paper exhibited in a constructive way an
achievable trade-off, namely (
√
,
√
,weak) with less than
√
n/ log2 n faulty-nodes, the boundaries of the design space are
yet to be determined.
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Table A.1
Table of notations.
Symbol Deﬁnition
 = {p1, . . . , pn} set of nodes
V input set
v= {vp}p∈ input conﬁguration
U output space
⊕ monoid operation on U
f : V ∗ → U function to be computed
op ∈ U output of node p
d : U →R+ distance measure on the output space
δV diameter of V (when V ⊆ U )
(n) diameter of the image space f (V n)
B coalition of faulty nodes (|B| its size)
T execution trace
dms natural distance on multi-sets (size of the symmetric difference)
k parameter of Lipschitz continuity
κ number of next groups on the ring (param. of AG-S3)
l number of proxies in each group (param. of AG-S3)
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